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In contrast to most other notions of implementation, posterior implementation is de…ned with respect to the information released by the mechanism. It requires that agents' strategies are optimal against others' strategies, given the precise information made available by the mechanism. It can be interpreted as a regret-free form of implementation: even after agents gain new information by observing some speci…ed features of the mechanism's outcome (usually the equilibrium action pro…le), they are still willing to stick to their original strategy.
This notion of regret-free implementation (which can be viewed as robustness with respect to the timing of choice) is di¤erent from the notion of robust-implementation that refers to the agent' prior beliefs and higher-order beliefs. As shown by Bergemann and Morris (2005) , robust implementation implies ex-post implementation in a large class of environments with quasilinear preferences, and thus it constitutes the main motivation for ex-post implementation.
Despite the stark di¤erence in interpretation, note that, if the information released by the mechanism includes all players' types, then posterior implementation coincides with ex post implementation. At the other extreme, if no further information is made available to agents, then posterior implementation coincides with Bayes-Nash implementation.
Particularly in settings where signals spaces are of higher dimension than actions spaces, some form of posterior implementation may be possible even if ex-post implementation fails (since in such settings agents are able to make only limited inferences about the signals behind particular actions) . We illustrate this phenomenon below.
Example 0.1 ² There are two bidders i 2 f1; 2g ; Claim 0.2 The second-price auction has a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium with an associated non-trivial allocation function.
Proof. We construct a symmetric equilibrium in continuous, strictly monotonic increasing bid functions b : [0; 1] 2 ! R. A necessary and su¢-cient condition for equilibrium is that each type (p; c) is indi¤erent between winning or losing the auction at a tie. This gives the usual condition:
Given signals' independence, the right hand side is equal to p i + c i c (b). Here, c (x) = E s ¡i [cjb (p; c) = x] is the expectation of the opponent's common values signal given that he makes bid x. This shows that the iso-bid curves b ¡1 (x) must be straight lines with slope ¡ 2 . Some tedious calculations show that the iso-bid lines are as follows:
(2) These iso-bid lines are drawn in Figure 1 below. Proof. Posterior implementation with respect to this disclosure policy requires optimality of each player's bid given other players' actual (rather than expected) bids. It is readily veri…ed that the equilibrium exhibited above has this property: conditional on observing the bid x of bidder ¡i, bidder i makes the inference that the expected value of c
, and therefore she is not willing to modify her bid.
It is easily checked that the above is not an ex post equilibrium: assume that (¡i)'s signal is 
